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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tion of the reasons given by the courts for excluding, in criminal trials,
evidence gathered by unreasonable search and seizure. Further, there
is good reason not to leave this issue of fact to the jury. It is doubtful
that the jury would be able to disregard the evidence, particularly when
there is-as in the principal case-no question as to its validity.
It is doubtful that the average jury would be interested in performing
the intellectual "gymnastic" of disregarding the evidence, their basic
aim being to do justice in the particular case rather than promote
long-term policies of law."
The court's approach, however, is not unique. On this particular
question,2 7 and in related areas of law,28 other courts have given
preliminary fact questions to the jury. Perhaps this is the result of
a "tenderness" for the party that would be adversely affected by
exclusion. 9 Whatever the basic reason behind the decision here, it
seems unfortunate that the court chose to ignore a commonly accepted
evidentiary principle by stating simply that "our system" gave them
no choice but to submit the question to the jury.3
DISCRETIONARY ACTS PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs sought damages from the State of Washington for property
destroyed by a juvenile escapee from Green Hill School, who set fire to
a church and adjoining house. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the
state was negligent in maintaining an "open program" in a "close
security" institution, and in assigning the juvenile, regarded as a
security risk, to the "open program."' Plaintiffs relied on a recent
statute purportedly abolishing state immunity from liability for torts
committed by officials, whether acting in a "governmental" or "prop-
cCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 53, at 123 (1954).
' McCreary v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 436, 307 S.W2d 948 (1957).
' Cases cited note 6 supra. See discussion and cases in 9 WIGSORE, EVIDENcE
§ 2550 (3d ed. 1940).
M'cCoRRicx, EVmENCE § 53, at 124 (1954).
66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 900, 406 P.2d at 626.
'Schools such as the one from which the juvenile escaped are "designated as close
security institutions to which shall be given the custody of children with the most
serious behavior problems." WASH. REv. CODE § 72.05.130(4) (1959). The institution
in question was comprised of various cottages to which boys were assigned. One cot-
tage provided "maximum security and disciplinary isolation when required," but
others were part of an "open program" which became "progressively less restrictive
relative to assignment to work details, unescorted movement between details and
school classes, recreational outlets, and intercottage association." 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at
246-47, 407 P.2d at 442.
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rietary" capacity.2 The trial court entered judgment on a verdict for
plaintiffs. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
reversed in a 7-2 decision. Held: The statute abolishing governmental
immunity does not apply to discretionary acts of officials charged with
implementing state policy; such acts are immune from judicial scrutiny
as to possible negligence. Evangelical United Brethren Church v.
State, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 243,407 P.2d 440 (1965).
The doctrine of governmental immunity, originating in the medieval
maxim "The King can do no wrong,"' has undergone a process of
slow disintegration in the United States.4 In many jurisdictions, lia-
bility depends upon whether the activity challenged is of a "govern-
mental" or "proprietary" nature.' This dichotomy has been abrogated
2Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 136, § 1, at 1680:
The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary
capacity, hereby consents to the maintaining of a suit or action against it for
damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a
private person or corporation.
During pendency of litigation in the principal case, the statute was amended. The
court took note of the new version in writing the opinion in the principal case.
The amended version states, WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.92.090 (1963) :
The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary
capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the
same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.
The king was deemed incapable of doing or thinking wrong. BLACKSTONE, COM-
.MENNTARIES 246 (17th ed. 1830). In the United States, the Supreme Court early re-jected the doctrine in Chisholm's Ex'r v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419 (1793), but a
storm of protest among the states led to ratification in 1796 of the eleventh amend-
ment, which restored the doctrine to its full vigor. See CUSHMAx, LEADING CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DECISiONS 263 (9th ed. 1950); Borchard, Governmental Responsiility in
Tort, IV, 36 YA.E L.J. 1, 38 (1926). Subsequently, the Supreme Court justified the
doctrine in Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), by stating that
"there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends."
The doctrine as applied to local public agencies did not originate with the theory
that the king can do no wrong. In Russel v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 539 (1788),
recovery was disallowed on a theory that it is better for an individual to sustain
injury than for the public to suffer inconvenience. See also Mower v. Inhabitants of
Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 6 Am. Dec. 63 (1812). The history of the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity is exhaustively treated by Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HAXv. L. Rlv. 1 (1963).
' See generally Borchard, supra note 3; Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liabil-
ity in Tort, 19 VA. L. REv. 97 (1923).
The governmental-proprietary dichotomy apparently originated in 1842 in Bailey
v. New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y.). Washington adopted the dichotomy in Russell v.
Tacoma, 8 Wash. 156 35 Pac. 605 (1894). In his treatise, PROSSER, TORTS § 125, at
1005 (3d ed. 1964), Professor Prosser states:
[T]he classification of particular functions as governmental or proprietary has
proved to be so confused and difficult, and has been subject to so much disagree-
ment, . . . that the reader must be referred to detailed consideration in the texts
on the law of municipal corporations.
WASH. Ray. CODE § 4.92.090 (1961) does away with the need to distinguish between
the two functions. But the holding in the principal case opens a new pandora's box,
namely the distinction between functions that are discretionary and those that are
not.
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in a few progressive jurisdictions, either judicially' or legislatively.7
However, those jurisdictions which have abolished the doctrine still
make an exception, and thus accord governmental immunity when the
alleged negligence arises out of a discretionary act performed by an
official charged with the implementation of governmental policy.s The
Washington court, having early adopted the "governmental-proprie-
tary" dichotomy,9 later insisted that the doctrine could not be judicially
abolished.'0 The legislature complied by enacting a statute abolishing
the immunity," since held by the court to apply to municipalities in
decisions which made no mention of a discretionary limitation.12
The court faced the issue of imposing the discretionary limitation
6 Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97,
359 P.2d 465 (1961) ; Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961) ; Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, (Fla.
1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. App. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 908 (1960) ; Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich.
231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist, 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962) ; Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
'E.g., WAsE. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (1963), quoted in note 2 supra; N.Y. CT.
CLAImS Acr § 8 (1947), which states:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and hereby assumes lia-
bility ... in accordance with the same rules . . . as applied against individuals
or corporations....
'Whenever sovereign immunity has been abolished, whether judicially or legis-
latively, some sort of discretionary limitation has been imposed. Thus, the federal
government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
(1964), for any claim arising out of an act "based upon the exercise or performance
or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function . . .whether or not the
discretion be abused." Similarly, a New York court, under a broad government
liability statute, N.Y. CT. CLAImS Acr § 8 (1947), recognized a discretionary limita-
tion by refusing to allow the question of a city's negligence in timing a traffic light
to go before the jury. Weiss v. Fote, 17 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63
(1960). And when California courts abolished the doctrine in a case concerning the
negligence of hospital employees in allowing plaintiff to fall and aggravate a broken
hip, the court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity no longer applied unless the
disputed action was discretionary. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961), 46 MiNN. L. REv. 1143 (1962) ; see also Lipman
v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465
(1961).
' Russell v. Tacoma, 8 Wash. 156, 35 Pac. 605 (1894). It has been pointed out that
the judicial approach to governmental immunity in Washington has been somewhat
confused. See generally Comment, 36 WAsn. L. Ray. 312, 316-17 (1961).
Kilbourn v. Seattle, 43 Wn. 2d 373, 379, 261 P.2d 407, 410 (1953).
See statutes cited note 2 supra. In the earlier version of the statute, the language
differed in that the state merely "consent[ed] to the maintaining of a suit or action
against it." It seems likely that the legislature amended the statute because of the
possibility that it might be given a restricted interpretation. An early example of
this type of statutory interpretation occurred in Billing v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 67
Pac. 583 (1902), in which the court was confronted with a statute which gave per-
sons "the right to bring an action against the state." The court held that no liability
could be had against the state which did not exist prior to the enactment of the
statute, and that the statute merely conferred jurisdiction upon courts to hear and
determine suits brought against the state. See also Howard v. Tacoma School Dist.
No. 10, 88 Wash. 167, 152 Pac. 1004 (1915).
See Hosea v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 678, 393 P.2d 967 (1964); Kelso v.
City of Tacoma, 63 Wn. 2d 913, 390 P2d 2 (1964). It was stated in the dissent in
the principal case that: "To date this court has not evinced judicial distaste for the
[VOL. 41: 517
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for the first time in the principal case. In adopting the limitation,
the court pointed out that the state policy underlying the delinquent
youth program necessarily requires the exercise of "executive expertise,
evaluation and judgment,"'13 and reasoned that, in any organized
society, there must be room for implementing basic governmental
policy unhampered by the fear of sovereign tort liability. As the policy
underlying Washington's delinquency program is to furnish that type of
care, instruction, and treatment most likely to accomplish rehabilita-
tion and restoration to normal citizenship, the majority determined
that the decision to create an "open program" in a "close security"
institution, and the decision to assign the escaping juvenile to such a
program, necessarily involved that type of discretion which could not
be challenged as negligent. The majority construed the statute as
applying only to those acts or omissions properly characterized as
"operational, ministerial or housekeeping" functions, treating policy
decisions embracing the exercise of "purely administrative or executive
discretion" as not being within its purview.
There is no doubt that the decision to establish the open program
was made at the administrative level, and that it was necessary to
effectuate the state's juvenile policy. It would seem, however, that
the decision to commit a particular juvenile to an open program does
not affect the basic juvenile rehabilitation policy; rather, the individual
commitment decision appears to belong to the "housekeeping" cate-
gory. 4 In view of the juvenile's prior record and classification as a
clearly articulated legislative policy abolishing the doctrine of sovereign tort im-
munity in this state." 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 260, 407 P.2d at 449.
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 255, 407 P2d at 447. The policy underlying the state's
juvenile program is set forth in WASH. REv. CoDE § 72.05.010 (1959), and, so far as
it is pertinent to the principal case, states that there shall be provided "that type of
care, instruction, and treatment most likely to accomplish rehabilitation and restora-
tion to normal citizenship."
"The court in the principal case promulgated the following test, 67 Wash. Dec.
2d at 252, 407 P.2d at 445:
[I]t would appear that any determination of a line of demarcation between
truly discretionary and other executive and administrative processes, so far as
susceptibility to potential sovereign tort liability be concerned, would necessitate
the posing of at least the following four questions: (1) Does the challenged act,
omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission or decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which
would not change the course or direction of the policy, program or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission or decision require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency in-
volved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite con-
stitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged
act, omission, or decision? If these preliminary questions can be clearly and
unequivocally answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or
decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as a discretion-
1966]
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security risk,' 5 it would also seem that the jury should have been
allowed to determine whether or not the state was negligent.
Because no legislative histories are provided by the Washington
legislature, the legislative purpose underlying the sovereign immunity
statute is open to speculation. Even though the legislature may have
"painted with the broadest possible brush"'" in purporting to abolish
sovereign immunity, and although there is substantial merit to the
argument that "discretionary" is a lesser included term within the word
"governmental,"" the majority nevertheless decided to adopt the
limitation as being inherent in the statute.' If, as seems likely, the
result reached in the principal case does not coincide with the purpose
of the statute, an amendment to the statute appears necessary. If the
result is consistent with that purpose, then future judicial elaboration
will be all that is needed. Before either legislative or judicial action
is taken, however, several arguments for and against limited sovereign
immunity should be considered.
Proponents of the discretionary limitation to sovereign immunity
point out the threat posed to orderly government by allowing a jury to
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive.10 To
properly perform his discretionary duties, an official must be free
from the threat of personal liability for torts committed in the line of
ary governmental process and nontortious, regardless of its unwisdom. If, how-
ever, one or more of the questions call for or suggest a negative answer, then
further inquiry may well become necessary, depending on the facts and circum-
stances involved.
Although the court reached a contrary conclusion, it seems clear that the decision to
commit the juvenile to an open program was not essential to the accomplishment of
the state's juvenile policy, nor did it require the exercise of basic policy evaluation.
It seems therefore, that had the court correctly applied its own test, an opposite result
should have been reached.
I The juvenile in question, a repeat inmate of Green Hill School, had set fires,
been involved in a disciplinary incident, and had been diagnosed as dangerously
psychotic with a recommendation that he be regarded as a security risk and accorded
close supervision. 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 245-48, 407 P.2d at 441-43.
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 260, 407 P.2d at 449 (dissenting opinion).
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 262, 407 P.2d at 450 (dissenting opinion). Indeed, little if
any difference exists between actions now classified as discretionary and those pre-
viously classified as governmental. E.g., keeping prisoners in jail, operating hos-
pitals, and maintaining public schools. See PROSSaR, TORTS § 125, at 1005-07 (3d ed.
1964) ; see also Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152, 110 A.L.R.
1110 (1937) (operation of hospital is a governmental function).
'The conclusion reached by the majority appears directly contrary to the literal
meaning of a comparatively lucid statute. See statute set out in note 2 supra.
' In Weiss v. Fote, 17 N.Y.2d 579, 585-86, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 413, 167 N.E.2d 63,
66 (1960), the court stated:
To accept a jury's verdict as to the reasonableness and safety of a plan of govern-
mental services and prefer it over the judgment of the governmental body which
originally considered and passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal
governmental operations and to place in inexpert hands what the legislature has
seen fit to entrust to experts.
[VOL. 41 : 517
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duty,"' and, it is argued, he must also be free from fear of exposing
the state to derivative liability caused by him as its servant.2 Both
the principal case22 and recent California decisions 3 recognized the
latter argument. Added to the threat of government disruption is
the theoretical immensity of the potential liability a state faces by
virtue of its far-reaching activities. Governments undertake many
operations not carried out by private groups; very often these activi-
ties affect vast numbers of people, and subject them to a relatively high
degree of risk.2 4 A final argument favoring retention of the discre-
tionary limitation is that it operates to limit the number of claims that
can be successfully prosecuted against the state, thereby serving to
reduce taxes.
One argument favoring removal of the discretionary limitation rests
upon the thesis that the burden of loss should be shifted from the
individual, who can least afford it, to the entire community, which can
best afford it." This argument is buttressed by the fact that insurance
is available to a state and its agencies.26 Thus, increased taxes can be
kept at a minimum27 while the state provides redress to those it wrong-
'See Bar v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959), in which the Supreme Court
held that a press release issued by the director of a government agency announcing
his intention to suspend two employees for conduct for which the agency had been
criticized was within the scope of the director's duties, and that he could not be
held liable on the ground that the release was libelous.
1 See 3 DAvis, AmmINISTRATIVE LAw § 26.01 (1958).
S67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 251, 407 P.2d at 444.
Leading cases involving state derivative liability are Lipman v. Brisbane
Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465 (1961), and
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359, P.2d 457 (1961).
In both cases, the court recognized a need for continued state immunity when the act
of the official was discretionary as distinguished from ministerial. The underlying
theory is that public officials must be free from the threat of state liability in order
to properly exercise the discretion granted to them.
-' For a list of some of the activities undertaken by a government, and a birds-eye
view of potential suits facing any state, see Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a
Sovereign Without Immunity, 36 So. CAL. L. Rrr. 161, 169-72 (1963).
' Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 21, 163 N.E.2d
89, 94 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) :
It is almost incredible that ... the medieval . . . maxim, "the King can do no
wrong," should exempt the various branches of government from liability for
their torts, and that the entire burden of damage ... should be imposed upon the
single individual who suffers the injury, rather than be distributed among the
entire community constituting the government, where it could be borne without
hardship on any individual and where it justly belongs.
See Gibbons, Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local
Government, 8 DUKE L.J. 588 (1959). Of course, purchase of insurance would have
to be authorized by statute or authorization of the funds might well be classified as
ultra-vires. See, e.g., Burns v. American Gas Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 198, 273 P.2d 605
(1954) ; Adams v. City of New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 41 A.2d 111 (1945).
'In Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1, 23-24 (1961), the court
pointed out that liability insurance was not available when the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity originated, and that a "scheme for prepaying and sharing the risk"
would only put a slight added tax burden on the public.
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fully injures. 8
Another argument pointed out that "tort liability is in fact a very
small item in the budget of any well organized enterprise."" As such,
tort liability should not be looked upon as wasting public funds.
Rather, the theory goes, tort settlements should be accorded the same
treatment as any other expenses incurred by the state in the operation
of its far-flung undertakings.3
A third argument attacks the questionable assumption that fear
of state liability will deter state officials from exercising the discre-
tionary powers conferred upon them.3' If payment is to be made out
of state funds, the fear of personal liability is removed, and no reason
exists to prevent a state official charged with implementing policy
from acting just as boldly as his corporate counterpart. Indeed, the
threat of state liability could lead to selection of more competent or
qualified employees, a result which would certainly be beneficial to
the community as a whole.32 One writer has even suggested that the
basis of governmental liability should not be fault at all, but should
be "equitable loss spreading," treating the cost imposed on taxpayers
as part of the price paid for living in our society.3 3 Finally, it has
also been suggested that an administrative agency be set up to alleviate
pecuniary loss, and judicial logjams, by allowing for speedy handling
of claims against the state while, at the same time, eliminating nuisance
suits, excessive claims, and capricious jury verdicts which could con-
'It has been suggested that the underlying rationale of the departure from gov-
ernmental immunity may be the recognition that the general trend of the times is to
provide redress to all persons who are injured or damaged. Another suggested basis
is the recognition by courts that governments are increasingly invading what was
once the private sector of the economy and that, therefore, governments should be
liable in the same way as private individuals. Kennedy & Lynch, s.lpra note 24, at
169. Other examples of the modern trend are evidenced by Workmen's Compensation
Laws, and the trend to strict tort liability in the products and realty fields. See
generally Note, 41 WAsH. L. REV. 166 (1966).
1 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. App. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89, 95, quoting from Green, Freedom of Litigatirn, III, 38 ILL. L. REV. 355,
378 (1943).
'o The court in Molitor, supra note 29, 163 N.E2d at 95, recognized that payments
in tort cases are not a dissipation of public funds: "[P]ayment of damage claims
incurred as an adjunct to transportation is [a] . .. proper authorized purpose as are
payments of other expenses....
"See Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 99, 359 P.2d 465, 467 (1961), where the argument went to the personal liabil-
ity of state officials. The court pointed out that immunity of a state agency should
not necessarily be coextensive with the immunity of its officials because, were the
policy to allow officers to exercise their discretion without fear, it would be unlikely
that knowledge of the state's liability for their torts would adversely affect their
performance.
'See Ropes, Torts Doctrine of Municipal Immunity-A Myth, 8 MIAM,11 L.Q.
555 (1954).
Davis, Tort Liability of Government Units, 40 Mimx. L. Rsv. 751 (1956).
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ceivably have a deleterious effect upon a smoothly functioning govern-
ment.
4
If the discretionary limitation on governmental liability is to be
retained, as appears likely, some form of test must be established by
which to apply the limitation. In curbing the statutory right of an
individual to redress for governmental torts, equity and justice de-
mand adoption of a rigid test. Indeed, by posing a set of four questions
to be asked in cases involving the discretionary limitation, the court
in the principal case did set forth a test which, if properly applied
in each case, would insure just application of the limitation. 5 How-
ever, the test is cumbersome and, as the holding in the principal case
indicates, easily misapplied. It would seem, therefore, that a simpler
but equally confining test should be substituted for the "four-question
test" in future cases.
Such a test is set forth by Professor Cornelius J. Peck in an article
concerning the discretionary limitation as applied to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.30 Professor Peck suggests that the burden should be on
the state to show affirmatively that the risk to which plaintiff was
subjected was "knowingly, deliberately or necessarily encountered by
one authorized to do so,... in order to achieve the objectives or
purposes" as laid down in the constitution, statute or regulation.37
By adopting this test, the court would preserve necessary governmental
autonomy, free from unpredictable interference by juries. At the
same time, however, the individual claimant would not arbitrarily be
denied recovery because the state would rebuttably be presumed liable.
EQUITY EXCEEDING HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
VALUE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION
An action was brought by the plaintiff widow to permanently enjoin
a judgment creditor from satisfying a judgment on a community debt
from the surplus equity in the homesteaded realty over the homestead
exemption. Plaintiff and her husband, in 1956, filed a valid declaration
of homestead on their residence in Washington, which was held as
"See Fuller & Casner, .1funicipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAgv. L. REV.
437 (1941).
See the questions set forth in note 14 supra.
Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed Construction of the Discre-
tionary Funwtion Exception, 31 v~rASH. L. REv. 207 (1956). Professor Peck exhaus-
tively treats the discretionary limitation as applied to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-78, 2680 (1964). See also Note, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 166 (1966).
'7 Peck, supra note 36, at 225-26.
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